First VPN Takedown Explained

Quick Verdict

What Happened?

Eurojust says French and Dutch authorities, supported by Eurojust and Europol, shut down a large-scale criminal virtual private network service known as First VPN. The agency says the service targeted cybercriminals by offering a secure environment for illegal activity such as hacking and ransomware attacks.

The joint action was coordinated at Eurojust on 19 and 20 May 2026. According to Eurojust, authorities dismantled more than 33 servers linked to the service, searched and interviewed a suspect in Ukraine, disrupted infrastructure used to support cybercriminal activity, and shut down the service's main domains plus associated onion domains.

Key Facts From Operation Saffron

Does This Mean VPN Privacy Is Under Attack?

Not automatically. VPNs are legitimate tools used by individuals, businesses, journalists, travellers, students and remote workers. A normal VPN can help protect traffic on public Wi-Fi, reduce exposure of a home IP address to websites, and secure access to workplace systems. The First VPN case is different because law enforcement says the service was promoted to cybercriminals and used to conceal serious offences.

The balance matters. A privacy-focused VPN should not be treated as suspicious simply because it protects users. At the same time, a service that allegedly markets itself as immune from every legal authority, appears on criminal forums, and becomes embedded in ransomware investigations will attract a different level of scrutiny.

Why This Matters

For cybersecurity teams, the takedown is a reminder that attackers often rely on commercial or semi-commercial anonymity services, not just malware. If a VPN service is used to route scanning, credential attacks, ransom negotiation traffic or stolen-data activity, defenders may see the same infrastructure appear across different incidents.

For ordinary VPN users, the story is also a reminder to choose providers carefully. Encryption alone does not prove trust. A VPN provider's business model, ownership, jurisdiction, transparency, privacy policy, audit record and abuse-response posture all matter. A service can use familiar VPN protocols and still be a poor trust choice if the surrounding operation is opaque or aimed at criminal use.

• Good privacy tools still matter: this case should not be used to suggest that all VPN use is suspicious.
• Provider behaviour matters: no-logs claims need context, evidence and independent scrutiny.
• Law-enforcement language matters: allegations and official claims should be reported carefully until court outcomes are known.
• Businesses should monitor unauthorised VPN use: unusual connections to unknown VPN infrastructure can be a risk signal.

Who Was Involved?

Eurojust says the joint investigation was led by French and Dutch authorities, supported by Europol and Eurojust. The action day involved authorities from France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Romania, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. Bitdefender says the wider operation involved 18 countries and that its researchers supported Europol by helping generate intelligence linked to hundreds of individuals.

Eurojust also says a joint investigation team was established in November 2023, allowing French and Dutch authorities to exchange evidence and coordinate prosecution strategy. That detail matters because cross-border cybercrime investigations rarely depend on one country's police force acting alone.

What VPN Users Should Learn

The lesson is not to avoid VPNs. The lesson is to separate privacy from impunity. A good VPN can be a sensible security and privacy tool, but no VPN should be treated as a magic shield for illegal activity. For legitimate users, the right response is to choose reputable services and understand exactly what a VPN can and cannot protect.

1. Check provider transparency: look for clear ownership details, independent audits and realistic privacy claims.
2. Read no-logs claims carefully: a marketing line is not the same as a tested technical and legal position.
3. Avoid suspicious services: providers promoted on criminal forums or promising total immunity from law enforcement are a red flag.
4. Do not ignore browser tracking: cookies, account logins and device fingerprints can still identify you even when a VPN is working.
5. Use VPNs legally: privacy is a legitimate aim, but a VPN does not make criminal behaviour lawful or invisible.

Business Security Checklist

Organisations should treat this as a reminder to review how VPN infrastructure appears in their logs. The point is not to block all VPN use blindly, because remote work and security teams often rely on VPNs. The point is to distinguish approved corporate access from unauthorised anonymisation services and suspicious connection patterns.

• Maintain an approved VPN list: document which remote-access tools are allowed for employees and contractors.
• Monitor unusual access patterns: repeated failed logins, password spraying, impossible travel and unknown VPN endpoints should be investigated.
• Use multi-factor authentication: VPN access without MFA remains a common route into business networks.
• Review historical logs: if law enforcement or security vendors publish relevant indicators, check them against your environment with context.
• Do not rely on IP reputation alone: cloud and VPN IP addresses can be reused, reassigned or shared by many users.